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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 11/03/2004 Accident number: 40 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 08/03/1995 
Where it occurred: Maganja da Costa, 
Zambezia Province 
Country: Mozambique 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 28/04/1995 
ID original source: AC Name of source: Other (consultants) 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: metal scrap 
 
Date record created: 22/01/2004 Date  last modified: 22/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inconsistent statements (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
 
Accident report 
No accident report was found on file at the Country MAC or the UN controlled demining 
group. A brief "Interim Report" was made available in November 1998. A full Accident report 
was made available by its author in July 1999. The author was a consultant representing the 
demining group's funder at the time. The later report included very similar text to the brief 
report and the substance is summarised here. 
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The investigator visited the site on 23rd March 1995. The mined area was adjacent to an 
airstrip and a "quite substantial quantity" of PMN and M969 mines had been cleared.  
On the day of the accident the demining group's ex-pat country Manager went in to 
investigate the accident of the previous day (7th March 1995)  and confirmed that the mine 
involved had been a PMN. He found parts of the device that he thought indicated that there 
had been two mines, but those parts were lost during subsequent events. When he went into 
the area a second time he spent ten minutes examining the area, then called out for people to 
gather together for a briefing. Immediately thereafter he was seriously injured by an explosion 
[no reason why he went back a second time was given]. The coincidental presence of a 
helicopter in the vicinity (at a commercial demining site) led to a rapid evacuation within 20 
minutes of the accident.  
The victim was flown to Quelimane hospital in "less than one hour" and flown from there to 
Johannesburg "at about 16.30". He lost his right leg about four inches below the knee and his 
right arm about four inches above the wrist. "..he is making a good recovery".  
"..circumstantial evidence suggests he was not injured by a mine", but by a booby trap 
"involving an uncased block of TNT". The presence of a PFM-1 mine in the area was taken as 
an indication of the possibility of booby-traps [it is not obvious why] and the investigator 
concluded the victim "was injured by a phenomenon not previously encountered in 
Mozambique". 
The victim said that he was blown into the air by the explosion and landed on his front. "He 
rolled over to look into the hole caused by the explosion to see if he could find what had 
happened". He remained conscious throughout and gave instructions on his treatment to the 
medic. 
The victim's apron was bloody but without fragment marks. The investigator said that his visor 
stayed in place. The accident investigator's time at the site was limited to two hours during 
which he could find no evidence of the device in the crater left by the explosion. He found that 
the victim's leg injuries could have been caused by a PMN, but he seemed to think it more 
likely that the cause was an uncased  block of TNT used as a booby-trap of some kind (other 
"circumstantial" evidence of booby-traps existed). Both the investigator and the surgeons 
found the victim's hand injuries hard to explain if he had stepped on a booby-trap. If he had 
been carrying another, smaller device it was felt that the damage might make sense, but the 
victim claimed to have been walking back to the end of the lane with a prodder in the hand 
that was damaged. He thought that his hand was behind him when the device went off.  
 
Conclusion 
The investigator concluded that "there is no obvious and logical explanation for the injury to 
his [the victim's] hand. "As far as can be ascertained, there was no error of procedure on his 
part". He believed that existing SOPs were adequate for the previously perceived threat but 
should be reviewed to cover the new threat perceived. He recommended that further work at 
the site should use excavation methods only. 
The investigator "found no evidence to suggest that the demining NGO operated in an unsafe 
way or that their procedures were unsound. However, he did find that the casevac procedures 
relied on "luck" and that the presence of a doctor to treat the casualty was also a matter of 
luck.  
 
Recommendations 
The investigator recommended that the demining group "reconsider" its casevac and medical 
arrangements. The grass on the airstrip that would have been used for a fixed-wing 
evacuation if the helicopter had not been present "may have been too long to allow" a 
landing. The investigator suggested checking that the air-strip was useable before starting 
work. He also suggested that the "possible change in threat" meant that the demining group 
might need to "reallocate a resident EOD trained team member to Mozambique". Also that 
future work at the site "must" be by excavation, with special care taken to look for "unusual 
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devices" and wires. A final recommendation was that the accident area should be "re-signed", 
the originals having been reported stolen. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 58 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 1 hour 
Protection issued: Short frontal vest 
Long visor 
Protection used: Short frontal vest, 
Long visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Below knee 
Arm Below elbow 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The doctor at Quelimane hospital described the victim's injuries. She said that "his right foot 
had gone leaving only the flesh of his heel with his lower leg complete down to the ankle joint. 
The skin immediately above the ankle was heavily marked by black spots. His right hand was 
damaged severely and although his fingers were intact, his palm flesh had gone and the 
bones were.... crushed to dust. His fingers were still attached to his lower arm by the skin on 
the back of his hand. He had no other injuries". 
The ICRC surgeon who had undertaken over 200 amputations following mine blasts said: 
"In my experience, there is rarely part of the mine case in the body of the victim unless it is a 
fragment mine. Buried mines with their plastic cases exert their damage from the blast not 
fragments; it is the earth and stones which are driven up into the body. The case itself either 
vaporises of forms particles of hot, carbonised material which either sticks to the skin or 
penetrates not very far. This is evidenced by small black burns around the wound." 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because 
the victim was the senior programme manager and was in breach of safe working practice by 
not checking the accident area adequately with a detector. The Victim was a new arrival and 
seems to have been inadequately prepared for his role, so the secondary cause is listed as 
“Inadequate training”. 
The investigator did not discover that the victim had gone into the accident area without 
checking it adequately with a detector. His time at the site was limited, but it is unusual for an 
investigator not to check the area themselves. Clearly he did not do that because 8Kg of 
metal was found there later.  
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 Related papers 
The full internal report included a sketch map of the site and photographs showing the 
vegetation and marking in use and the victim's armour and visor. 
In an informal interview with the demining NGO's country Manager on 16th December 1998, 
he reported that the mine was believed to have been a "boosted" PMN (boosted with either a 
second mine or a TNT block). This was inferred from the absence of mine debris in the crater 
and the severity of the blast injuries. The lane in which the accident occurred was re-cleared 
and  8 kg of metal recovered – which was so striking that it was kept in the NGO's office for 
some time. The victim had taken a detector into the lane but obviously did not check it 
properly or he would have found the metal.  
In January 1999 a Technical Advisor with another demining group in the area reported that an 
NR409 boosted with a 200g block of TNT had been found at the same site. 
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